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Also Come to Them”
The Politics of the Urban Poor in Postwar Colombo
by Harini Amarasuriya and Jonathan SpencerAfter the end of the country’s 30-year civil war in 2009, the Sri Lankan armed forces continued to grow despite the
complete absence of obvious military threats to the government. Under the guidance of the president’s brother, the
Stud
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q 201Ministry of Defence has played a leading role in town planning through the Urban Development Authority (which
formally became part of the ministry in 2010). Colombo has seen an aggressive program of improvement, which
started with a “war” on alleged underworld ﬁgures, took in the eviction of hawkers from pedestrian spaces, and
involved the clearance of “substandard” housing, especially in places such as Slave Island, a historically dense area
near the city center. In this paper we try to capture the temporal properties of a particular moment in the history of
the city when speculative capital and military force combined in an attempt to bypass the well-worn channels of
urban politics. At the end of the paper we consider events of early 2015, when the incumbent president was defeated
and urban development was immediately removed from the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.
twar 2009–2014: A Work in Progress used as a torture center by government forces during thePos
Imagine you wake up one morning and discover that now
Ja-
natha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP; People’s Liberation Front) in-
surgency of the late 1980s.1 Whatever the truth of the story,that the long war is over, the Ministry of Defence has taken
over the city. Soldiers are clearing public areas of unsightly
hawkers, constructing parks, and cleaning up weed-choked
canals. For the ﬁrst time in living memory, three-wheeler driv-
ers are sullenly forced to charge the fare recorded on their jour-
ney meters. Pedestrians step into crossings on the busiest roads
without the fear of sudden death. And poor people live in fear
of the orange stickers that might indicate that their housing is
scheduled for demolition.
While the Tamil-speaking areas of northern and eastern
Sri Lanka stagnated economically during the 30 years of war,
Colombo and its large suburban penumbra boomed. High-
rise apartments, luxury hotels, and supermarkets spread out
from the center of the city, amid the uneasy ebb and ﬂow of
checkpoints and road closures set up to contain the threat of
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ) suicide bombers. It
is whispered that Colombo’s top-end shopping center (Odel,
opposite the Town Hall) is housed in a building that had been
Harini Amarasuriya is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Social
ies at the Open University of Sri Lanka (Nawala, Nugegoda, Sri
a [hnama@ou.ac.lk]). Jonathan Spencer is Regius Professor of
Asian Language, Culture and Society in the School of Social and
ical Science at the University of Edinburgh (Chrystal Macmillan
ing, 15A George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, United Kingdom
than.spencer@ed.ac.uk]). This paper was submitted 4 VIII 14,
ted 27 III 15, and electronically published 20 VII 15.
5 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights re
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0
All use subject to JSTOR Tit is hard to think of a more apt metaphor for Colombo’s re-
lationship to the history of the war, an inconvenient history of
torture effaced in a blitz of shopping.
Postwar Colombo is a work in progress, as is Postwar more
generally. Aided by an ineffectual and directionless opposi-
tion, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has consolidated politi-
cal control through a series of victories in national and local
elections. “Reconstruction” is the word on everyone’s lips, and
it is mostly taken very literally—building a new airport, a
new harbor, new hotels and resorts. The most conspicuous
signs of Postwar are the new roads being built across the is-
land, introducing a change in the rhythm of travel as smooth,
fast stretches alternate with slow, bumpy progress past the
latest unﬁnished roadworks. But for all the signs of a gov-
ernment in total control, there is also a sense of constant im-
provisation in Postwar statecraft, a feeling that someone at
the top is, for want of a better description, making it up as he
goes along. Initiatives are announced (and sometimes forgot-
ten) in a spirit of apparent whimsy. This is compounded by
the fact that government is rarely singular and rarely coordi-
nated. Ministries, of which there are many, operate as the per-
sonal ﬁef of the ministers, although the choicest berths are
1. The newest, and possibly glitziest, shopping complex in the city,
the Arcade at Independence Square is said to occupy the site where the
writer and activist Richard de Zoysa was murdered in 1990.
served. 0011-3204/2015/56S11-0008$10.00. DOI:10.1086/681926
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almost entirely reserved for members of the president’s ex-
tended family. One of these is the Ministry of Defence, con-
urban politics, frequently identiﬁed with the ﬁgure of Rana-
singhe Premadasa, Colombo politician and former president,
Colombo is by far the biggest city in Sri Lanka, and not sur-
with a minority of Christians; most Tamils are Hindu, but again with a
minority of Christians; Muslims have been classiﬁed as an ethnic group
(or “race” in colonial nomenclature) since the nineteenth century. While
Amarasuriya and Spencer Politics of the Urban Poor in Postwar Colombo S67trolled by the president’s brother Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Got-
abhaya Rajapaksa is formally a civil servant, the secretary to the
ministry for which his brother the president is minister, but
he has used his ministry as the base from which to launch a
remarkable public career. As a former soldier engaged in high-
proﬁle public work, he is always keen to emphasize the fact
that he is not a politician.2 With no war to ﬁght, his Ministry of
Postwar has expanded its ambitions to include a broad range of
activities, from helping the Ministry of Higher Education to
provide “leadership” training for university students to urban
planning and something called the “Colombo Green Growth
Programme.”
Alongside the improvisation is a pervasive sense of appre-
hension: hard-core Buddhist nationalists, having won the war,
solemnly announce they are threatened as never before. Ru-
mors ﬂy from person to person: Muslims are stocking their
mosques with weapons in order to prepare for jihad; toxins
have been discovered in New Zealand milk powder; furtive
men covered in oil—“grease devils”—are attacking unprotected
women. The uncertainties of Postwar are the subject of this
paper. We started on the trail of the urban poor, apparent vic-
tims of proposed resettlement, but found ourselves in the midst
of a bigger, more inchoate phenomenon, an attempted reimagi-
nation of urban space, apparently inspired by Singapore and Los
Angeles, and an experiment in new forms of governance that
cut across the more established channels of urban politics.
In what follows, we ﬁrst provide a little context on Colombo
as a city and its place in the politics and political economy of
Sri Lanka in the years of civil war. We then look more closely
at one high-proﬁle case of threatened redevelopment, the cen-
tral area of the city known as Slave Island, where long-term
residents face eviction and uncertainty. The Slave Island scheme
is part of a larger project, the so-called beautiﬁcation of the
city, led by the Defence Secretary. Alongside the leisure facil-
ities for the expanding middle class and the cleaned-up pave-
ments, the city has also seen somewhat less beautiful new
political phenomena in the form of attacks on mosques and
Muslim-owned businesses. In our paper we seek to treat all
these phenomena as potential components of a single process,
a politics of postwar uncertainty, embodied for some in the
person of theDefence Secretary himself.We contrast this emerg-
ing form of postwar politics with more established modes of
2. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa served as an ofﬁcer in the Sri Lankan army
until his retirement in 1992, after which he moved to the United States
and lived for a time in Los Angeles. He returned to Sri Lanka in 2005
when his brother Mahinda was elected President, and he was appointed
Secretary to the Ministry of Defence immediately after the election. His
appointment was followed by an immediate hardening of attitudes to-
ward the LTTE (still ofﬁcially observing a ceaseﬁre with the govern-
ment), and he was widely credited (not least by himself ) with overseeing
their eventual defeat in May 2009. As a public ﬁgure he has had an
especially turbulent relationship with the media, publicly threatening his
critics in the press on many occasions.
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alike 20 years after his assassination.
The bulk of this paper was written in 2013 and early 2014,
as we conducted and updated the ﬁeldwork on which it is
based. In what follows we employ a very particular voice,
employing the present tense to convey the peculiar tempo-
rality of that moment in the history of Sri Lanka, but also
allowing our skepticism about the government’s authoritar-
ian performative style to come across at points in the ar-
gument when we thought such skepticism appropriate. We
return to the issue of voice, and the time of our writing, in
the closing section, which brings the story forward to the
early months of 2015.
Colombo and the Political Economy of Warprisingly serves as both a hub for economic activity and
a complex cultural signiﬁer—of colonialism, of development
and modernity, of class and privilege. Colombo is ﬁrst and
foremost a port city, a relation of Penang and Singapore, Mum-
bai and Cochin, in the family of Indian Ocean trade. It very
conspicuously lacks overt ties with Buddhist nationalist his-
toriography; it is not found in the list of sites visited by the
Buddha on his legendary trips to the island, nor was it ever
the seat of Buddhist kings. It was the center of Buddhist ac-
tivism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, but those
activists often had to look beyond the city’s boundaries—to
Kelaniya and farther aﬁeld to Anuradhapura—to ﬁnd a geo-
graphical focus for their new forms of public Buddhism (Nis-
san 1985; Walters 1996).
Colombo has grown in the years since independence, but
it remains well short of anything like a stereotypical Asian mega-
city. The latest census ﬁgures give a population of 2.3 mil-
lion for the larger Colombo District, which includes the sur-
rounding suburbs, but only 318,000 for Colombo municipality
itself.3 Demographically, the heart of Colombo is multiethnic
and multireligious, but it is surrounded by growing suburbs
3. The overall population distribution by ethnicity is Sinhala 75%,
Sri Lanka Tamil 11%, Muslim 9%. Most Sinhala are Buddhists, butthe larger Colombo District is 77% Sinhala, in line with the national av-
erage, Colombo municipality is only 25% Sinhala, with Muslims (40%)
and Sri Lankan Tamils (31%) the biggest ethnic component of the pop-
ulation. In contrast, some of the suburbs which have grown since the
1970s are much more ethnically homogeneous; Maharagama is 96%
Sinhala, Homagama is 98% Sinhala, Kesbewa is 97% Sinhala. The same
is true for religious afﬁliation: Buddhists are less than 20% of the pop-
ulation in Colombo municipality but over 90% in many of the subur-
ban districts.
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that are strikingly monoethnic and monoreligious. The heart
of the city is Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist; some
The Mews Street Incident
We start our story in 2010, when, after winning his sec-
S68 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Supplement 11, October 2015suburbs are overwhelmingly Buddhist. The expansion of the
Colombo suburbs is a product of the social transformations
that have followed economic liberalization in the late 1970s.
These suburbs are the home of the new Sinhala middle class.
They are also the areas of strongest support for the new
forms of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism that took shape in the
ﬁnal decade of the war. Despite considerable continuities
with the style of Buddhist nationalism that came to promi-
nence in the 1950s, the “new” nationalism of the later war
years has rather different targets and concerns. Its main en-
emies are not the secessionist ﬁghters of the LTTE but evan-
gelical Christian groups, international NGOs, and more re-
cently, Muslims. Rooted in the new middle class that has
grown as a result of economic liberalization, the new na-
tionalism displays an ambivalent relation to that same lib-
eralization, which is often presented as a source of cultural
and moral degeneration.4
Four other long-term political trends have shaped Colombo
as we ﬁnd it today. Its relatively small size is a result of a post-
independence population movement in which the rural poor
sought a better future in migration, but rather than migrate
to the cities, they moved to less densely populated rural areas
in the dry zone of the north and east (Kearney and Miller 1985;
Moore 1985, 1990; Spencer 1990, 2003). Ofﬁcial planning for
the ﬁrst 40 years of the country’s history focused on a vision of
rural rather than urban modernity and on the socioeconomic
potential of these apparently “empty” areas of the island’s dry
zone (cf. Gunaratna 2006). The areas where the migrants settled
now have very high concentrations of rural poverty and not
coincidentally became the main sources of security force re-
cruitment as the police and army expanded in the last years
of the war (Venugopal 2009; World Bank 2007). They are
also the heartland of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s electoral support.
Insofar as security force employment has come to provide a
vital economic safety net in these areas, the government needs
to ﬁnd ever more uses for the youngmen and women who have
been signed up. This is one obvious rationale for the army’s
role in urban development. Colombo, in contrast, has been one
of only two sites of significant electoral defeat for the govern-
ment since Rajapaksa’s presidential victory in 2005, and this
must make it especially attractive for a certain kind of social
engineering.5
4. The ultranationalist party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya, which ﬁelded
Buddhist monks in its election campaign in 2004, won eight of its nine
parliamentary seats in the area around Colombo. For more on the
changing shape of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism after the 1990s, see
Amarasuriya and Spencer (2012), Berkwitz (2008), Deegalle (2004), and
DeVotta and Stone (2008).
5. The other zone of dissidence is the Tamil-dominated Northern
Province, where provincial council elections were won by the Tamil
National Alliance in late 2013, and this, too, is an area of major military
involvement in social and economic transformation.
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Urban Development Authority (UDA) under the MOD.6
The war between the military and the LTTE ended in May
2009, yet ﬁnancial allocations for the MOD have grown
ever higher since the end of the war (Ratnayake and de Mel
2012). A growing share of this has been used to implement
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s vision of urban development. Describ-
ing the Greater Colombo Development Project in 2011, the
Defence Secretary said that Colombo’s potential needs to be
unleashed. Thus, the Greater Colombo Development Project
includes repairing the drainage system, rehabilitating lakes
and urban wetlands, creating a new transport system and a
new road network, building a new city on land reclaimed
from the sea, and what is termed “rationalizing” land use
and “freeing up” land for development. While the “rational-
izing” of land use involves shifting key administrative units
to the country’s capital complex at Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte,
“freeing up” land for development also includes relocating
“slum dwellers” in Colombo.7 Colombo, like most other Asian
cities, has its share of poor housing and low-income com-
munities (UNDP 2012). Stereotypically, this segment of the
population is usually blamed for most of the city’s crime and
squalor; they also provide the brute force that helps politi-
cians from all sides of the political spectrum subdue their
opponents when required.
In a 2012 interview with Business Today, the Defence
Secretary set out his vision for Colombo and speciﬁcally
talked about the clearances in the area known as Slave Island.
We have started a programme to remove unauthorised
constructions such as slums and relocate them into proper
housing. We cannot allow these people to live under such
low standards. . . . We must give them the opportunity to
live well. With that, discipline will also come to them. It is
not that they don’t like to live like that.
His interlocutor mentions potential unpopularity and receives
this reply:
Yes, but we are not throwing people out of their homes.
We always look after them but they must understand, this
is for their beneﬁt. We have to do such programmes for the
advancement of the people and the country. . . . Unfortu-
nately there are people who, without understanding or
thinking of the country, its future and development, try to
mislead. That is why they protest. It is very important for
the public to understand what we are doing. We need to
demolish unauthorised constructions and remove pave-
ment hawkers if we are to move forward and develop their
6. Gazette extraordinary no. 1651/20, dated April 30, 2010. President
Rajapaksa himself is the Minister of Defence.
7. Sunday Times, April 3, 2011.
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lives and standards. We must move fast because we were
lagging behind due to the war that lasted 30 years.8
the UDA. At this meeting, they were informed that they
would be granted a rent of Rs8,000 per month for a period of
Amarasuriya and Spencer Politics of the Urban Poor in Postwar Colombo S69A petition ﬁled in the Supreme Court by several residents of
Mews Street documents another side of the same story. Mews
Street was one of the ﬁrst sites of “relocation.” Mews Street is
located in one of the oldest parts of Colombo, Slave Island.
Slave Island’s name derives from colonial days, when, it is
said, slaves from East Africa brought by the Portuguese and
the Dutch were kept there (Gunaratna 2006). Interspersed be-
tween hotels and commercial spaces, on narrow lanes and alleys
are residential streets. The residents in these areas are mainly
Muslim, predominantly from the small Malay community,
with some Tamils and Sinhalese. On May 4, 2010, Mews Street
residents were visited by ofﬁcers from the UDA and asked to
attend a meeting the following day. About 20 residents who
went to this meeting were informed that the UDA had re-
ceived instructions from the MOD some months earlier to
demolish the houses. The residents were asked to vacate their
houses by May 8, as that was the date ﬁxed for demolition.
The UDA ofﬁcers told them they would be provided with
alternative housing, and the residents then requested that they
be allowed to inspect these alternative houses.9
On May 6, several residents visited these alternative houses
accompanied by an ofﬁcer from the UDA. They found that
most were temporary houses built with planks, with shared
outdoor bathroom facilities, and some were already occupied.
The residents said that they were not agreeable to these tem-
porary accommodations.10 Despite the residents’ refusal to
vacate their homes, and with no assurance of acceptable, al-
ternative housing, on May 8, according to newspaper reports
and court documents, around 2,500 members of the police,
riot police, army, air force, and UDA ofﬁcers arrived at Mews
Street and started demolishing the houses using backhoes and
diggers. In total, 17 houses were demolished, home to 107
residents, of whom 24 were minors.11 Residents tried to contact
local politicians, some of whom arrived on the scene, but many
of the more powerful and well connected conspicuously kept
away. (Some are said to have prudently switched off their
mobile phones as events unfolded [Thaheer 2014].) Protest-
ing residents were forcibly removed by the armed forces and
the police, who refused to record their complaints. On the
same day, the army began constructing a wall, assimilating
the land on which these houses were built to the adjacent
MOD headquarters. A military school for children of the armed
forces now stands on the land.
On May 11, the former residents of Mews Street, many
of whom were living in makeshift tents opposite their de-
molished houses, were asked to attend another meeting at
8. InterviewwithBusinessWeek, reproduced on theMinistry ofDefence
website, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fnamepbusiness_todays_cover_story
_tam_20120509_05, October 5, 2012, accessed February 9, 2015.
9. Supreme Court Fundamental Rights Application no. 349/2010.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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UDA promised to provide acceptable alternative housing within
12 months. The residents were also offered Rs5,000 per house
as “transport cost” to move whatever belongings they had
salvaged from their demolished homes to their new accom-
modations. They were also told that they would receive new
apartments in the Mihindu Senpura housing scheme that was
being constructed outside the city. However, in 2013 these
apartments were given to supporters of a ruling-party politi-
cian and not to the residents of Mews Street as promised.
A prominent opposition MP accused the government of at-
tempting to change the demography of Colombo by shift-
ing minority communities out of the city. He claimed that
the Mews Street residents had now been told they would
be given housing outside the Colombo Municipal Council
limits.12 The residents themselves are not unaware of the wider
politics of these evictions and development plans. “We al-
ways voted for the UNP [United National Party], no? That
is why they want to move us. But they are stupid. Do they
think we will stop voting for the UNP because they move us
from here? Wherever we are, we will vote for the UNP.”
Residents of Java Place, Malay Street, Justice Akbar Maw-
atha, and Masjidul Jamiah Mawatha, all located in Slave Is-
land, have since been told to vacate their homes to make
way for redevelopment under the Slave Island Area Project.
Residents said that they had attended several meetings or-
ganized by the UDA and had attempted to argue against
these developments. One woman claimed that at a particular
meeting, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa had threatened to throw them
out by their necks if they made too much noise. The Indian-
owned TATA Development Company has been given the
contract to build apartments and “develop” the area. Some
residents petitioned the Supreme Court in an attempt to get
a stay order on the project. However, the court ruled that
the evictions would go ahead, with residents being given a
lump sum to cover alternative housing for 2 years. Residents
have been told by the UDA that by that time an apartment
complex would be built in the same area, to which they could
eventually return. The controversial Chief Justice Mohan Pieris
reportedly endorsed the ongoing development of the Co-
lombo area and stated that improving housing and lifestyles
of low-income communities would ensure that they refrain
from crime and vice.13 Since this latest court decision, some
residents have started moving out. Others complained that
they have yet to receive money, that those who ﬁled cases are
being deliberately targeted, and that their money is being
12. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/on-the-plight-of
-evicted-muslims-at-slave-island/, December 9, 2013, accessed Febru-
ary 9, 2015.
13. https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/no-mercy-for-shanty
-dwellers-challenging-uda-from-de-facto-cj/, October 1, 2013, accessed Feb-
ruary 9, 2015.
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delayed. As one evicted man told us, “This is a vicious gov-
ernment—protesting against them is like stepping on a snake;
apartment or rent allowance?” asked one of the women, “How
can we all ﬁt into one little apartment?”
S70 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Supplement 11, October 2015they turn around and attack you—that is how this govern-
ment behaves.”
“Ofﬁcially,” these communities are gripped by poverty,
crime, and deviance, but this is far from obvious to visitors
to the area. Slave Island is a bewildering maze of narrow
alleys lined with houses of varying sizes and designs. Most
of the homes extend up two or three stories. Many are brightly
painted with impressive facades. Some are surprisingly spa-
cious when you enter, usually accommodating several fami-
lies. Most houses also are sites of some kind of income-
generation activity. One elderly couple, who share their home
with the families of their son and daughter, cook thousands
of “string hoppers” daily to supply nearby shops.14 The grand-
children go to one of the ubiquitous English-medium “inter-
national schools” nearby. The son-in-law is a chef in a local
restaurant, while the son is away working in the Middle East.
By late 2013, some residents had already started mov-
ing. They had received money and found homes to rent in
other parts of Colombo. However, their children still attend
schools in Slave Island, and many of the adults have jobs in
the area as well. One man, watching a neighbor prepare to
move, claimed that he had decided to stay on in his home
till he died. He moved his family, he said, but he refused to
leave the area. “I don’t need the money they [the govern-
ment] are giving me. I have an income of 200–300 thousand
a month. One of my daughters is in France. I have a good job
in a bank. This is my home. I am not leaving.” He pointed to
the funeral announcement of an old lady pasted on a nearby
wall. “She died of heartbreak. Not even two weeks after she
moved. She couldn’t stand the sorrow of having to move from
her home.”
Promises made to residents offering alternative tempo-
rary accommodation, rent money, and the possibility of re-
turning to new apartments often fail to take account of the
complex household arrangements that exist in these com-
munities. One woman who had leased her house for over
15 years claimed that she had received nothing while her ten-
ants were given money to rent another house for 2 years and
promised a new apartment in the future. “Because we are
Muslims, these ofﬁcials think we are uneducated and stupid.
That we don’t understand anything.” One of the biggest com-
plaints is that the new apartments are built for small nuclear
families, whereas current living arrangements are far more
complex. As families expand, they build on existing prop-
erty, usually adding ﬂoors to existing houses. One family liv-
ing in Java Lane, shifted to the woman’s maha gedera (natal
home) close by in Church Street. They simply added another
ﬂoor using the money they received from the government for
rent. The maha gedera now holds the parents, two grown-up
sons, a daughter, and their respective families. “If we are
asked to move from this house, will we each be given an
14. A type of steamed noodle made with rice ﬂour.This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0
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Master plans for the development of the Colombo region
have come and gone for decades, but none have ever been
comprehensively implemented. At the same time, successive
governments have created ever more ministries in order to
ensure every ruling-party MP has a seat at the table, a berth,
however small, on the gravy train of state resources. As a
result, there is a bewildering range of departments, units, and
divisions—each claiming some part of urban development
and planning in Sri Lanka—not to mention a plethora of
plans and documents. In addition to the UDA, which is cur-
rently under the MOD, there is also a National Housing De-
velopment Authority, the Urban Settlement Development Au-
thority, and the National Physical Planning Department, all of
which currently fall under the purview of the Ministry of Con-
struction, Engineering Services, Housing and Common Ame-
nities. The Colombo Municipal Council has its own planning,
construction, engineering, and development divisions. The
UDA looms large over all these institutions and seemingly has
the authority to override any of their decisions, not least be-
cause of its vastly bigger command of capital and labor power.
International donor agencies and private developers have
also entered the picture. The World Bank is one of the main
sources of funding for the Metro Colombo Urban Develop-
ment Project and the associated Green Growth Programme.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency is supporting a
township development project that includes a new road and
transport system. Much of the property development is appar-
ently taking place through private developers from China, In-
dia, and Pakistan. This dizzying mix of agents and agencies
means that it is not easy to unravel who is responsible for
which part of the development. This blurring of responsibil-
ities has meant that agencies also struggle in a micropolitics
of representation. On the whole, the UDA is keen to attach the
imprimatur of the World Bank to its many signboards on im-
provement sites even as the bank itself is just as keen to main-
tain a distance from more controversial projects, such as the
threatened evictions.
But in the eyes of the public, all the “development” and the
“beautiﬁcation” is linked with one person: Gotabhaya Raja-
paksa. Above all, the new Colombo is seen as his vision and as
a product of his style of governance. He is presented as a per-
son who can get things done. While his methods may disturb
a few, the Colombo that is being envisaged is one with which
the middle class is quite comfortable. Soon after the war ended
in 2009, several “underworld” leaders were killed—allegedly in
intergang skirmishes. Most of the victims were Muslim, prompt-
ing protests from that community.15 There were reports of
15. Charles Haviland, “S Lanka Muslim Protest at Police,” Septem-
ber 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8238454.stm. on Tue, 17 Nov 2015 10:58:23 AM
erms and Conditions
beggars disappearing. Perhaps the greatest furor was over the
disappearance of Colombo’s stray dogs.
names of all the elite Colombo boys schools who call on him
to perform at cricket matches and “old boys” dances and
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also resonates with the attitude of the middle class to politics—
that politics is about manipulating and appeasing constit-
uencies for votes. Politics is viewed as dominated by short-
term expediency rather than doing what is right. Gotabhaya
Rajapaksa’s disregard, in particular, for the concerns of Mus-
lim constituencies long regarded as controlling Colombo city
also resonates with the newly resurgent form of Sinhala Bud-
dhist nationalism that has become more strident and anti-
Muslim since the end of the war.
The other person whose mark on the city is still spoken
of in reverential tones is the late President Ranasinghe Pre-
madasa, whose own career started in Colombo urban politics
and who retained a keen interest in urban housing up to his
1993 assassination by the LTTE. Often viewed as authori-
tarian and dictatorial, his period in ofﬁce was one of Sri
Lanka’s most violent and turbulent times, yet after his death,
Premadasa is evoked more for his programs in favor of the
poor than his part in these other events. During the early
years of liberalization in the late 1970s and the 1980s, UNP
politicians like Premadasa created grandiose personal proj-
ects to fuel their political careers (Tennekoon 1988). Pre-
madasa’s projects included the Village Awakening Programme
(Gam Udawa), the One Million Housing Scheme, and the
Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme (Brow 1996; Wani-
garatne 1997). While the special focus of these projects was
the rural poor, Premadasa also targeted the urban poor and
the middle class. Low-income urban areas were “upgraded”
with better access to basic amenities and regularization of ti-
tle in many cases, and the middle class were provided with
the opportunity to invest in state-led “housing schemes” that
sprang up in the suburbs. The central area, which was Pre-
madasa’s own constituency, received special attention. Many
of the wattes (shanty settlements) earmarked for development
under the current regime contain beneﬁciaries of Premadasa’s
housing projects. Over the years, residents have built on and
added to these homes, resulting in a complex legal situation
where establishing ownership is rarely straightforward. How-
ever, people in these areas continue to refer to their homes
as “Premadasamahattayage geval” (Premadasa’s houses).
Premadasa’s legacy is still visible in Slave Island as well.
On one of the streets in Slave Island is a little kovil (Tamil
Hindu shrine). Curious about the presence of a kovil in a
mainly Muslim area, we wandered up to it. A few people
were seated on steel chairs placed in a circle outside. One
man, bare chested and long haired, wearing earrings and a
multitude of holy threads around his neck, stood up as we
approached and asked what we wanted. He turned out to be
the priest in charge. He also has another job as the manager
and main musician of a papara band.16 He reeled off the
16. Papara bands consist of a group of musicians playing a range of
brass instruments and drums. These bands are a popular sight at cricketThis content downloaded from 23.235.32.0
All use subject to JSTOR Tevents. The outside wall of his house is festooned with pic-
tures and paper cuttings. On closer inspection, it appeared that
one of the pictures was a framed collage made up of images
of President Premadasa as a child with his parents. A framed
certiﬁcate, signed by President Rajapaksa for performing at
a National Youth Council event, hangs next to this. The priest
said that he had collected newspaper articles and pictures of
Premadasa all his life. He then went into his house and emerged
with the deeds, which he had obtained during Premadasa’s
time, and showed them to us. “I have all the right papers to
show that I own this property. I keep them with me so that
they can’t just throw me out.”
Premadasa’s program of upgrading low-amenity housing in
urban areas has continued up to the present, albeit punctu-
ated by rather different approaches to the urban poor (Wakely
2007). In a project that anticipated many of the new UDA
schemes, a high-rise apartment building known as Sahasra-
pura was built on the outskirts of Colombo in the late 1990s,
and shanty dwellers were cleared from prime central land
and moved into the new building complex. The idea was that
private investors would pay for the new housing by buying
up the site of the old housing, but the promised new invest-
ment never arrived, and the scheme was not replicated at the
time. But this project, although seen as a partial failure at the
time, now serves as the model for the new proposed devel-
opments in Slave Island and elsewhere.
The Antinomies of Beautiﬁcation
Visitors to Colombo notice that there is a lot of construction
work going on in the city. Whereas there was a certain ran-
domness to past roadwork and disruption, this roadwork
has a new uniform quality to it. Old pavements are dug up,
and pale pink bricks are laid in all the newly constructed
pavements. Roads have been widened, and a bewildering one-
way system has been established, considerably inconvenienc-
ing users of public transport while possibly easing trafﬁc for
private vehicles. Old and not-so-old walls that surrounded
government buildings have been pulled down, making spaces
suddenly larger than before. Trees that had lined the streets
for hundreds of years and had grown somewhat chaotically—
proving hazardous for unwary walkers or causing sudden dis-
ruptions during thundershowers due to falling branches—have
been chopped down or pruned. New trees are now being
planted at regular intervals. Observant visitors would also note
that those working on the construction and clearing and
cleaning the spaces are not typical workers. Many of them are
dressed alike, sport the same haircuts, and carry themselves
with a certain precision; much of the reconstruction work in
Colombo is being carried out by military personnel. This is
matches and even society weddings and dances. Their rhythmic and
loud music is usually a signal for all to get on the dance ﬂoor. on Tue, 17 Nov 2015 10:58:23 AM
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also a new feature of Sri Lanka’s Postwar, where the military
has been gradually involving itself in assuredly nonmilitary
training in mosques and secret contraceptives being fed to un-
witting Buddhist women who made the mistake of shopping
S72 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Supplement 11, October 2015activities ranging from farming to construction to the hospi-
tality trade. When vegetable prices skyrocketed in Colombo,
the military sold vegetables. In the Jaffna Peninsula, they have
opened a luxury hotel.
Certain spaces have been completely transformed. Inde-
pendence Square in Colombo 7 is marked by a rather majestic
monument built to celebrate independence from the British.
This area occasionally attracted attention during Independence
Day, or when a visiting foreign dignitary arrived, but other-
wise it was used mainly by Sri Lanka’s elite athletes for train-
ing. A few of Colombo’s residents also used to walk for exer-
cise in the area. Under the UDA Metro Colombo Development
Project, the area has been turned into a beautifully organized
walking area. Paths have been laid out between neatly planted
trees and carefully laid grass. The area is well lit, and police
patrol discreetly. During early mornings, and in the evenings,
the surrounding areas are ﬁlled with walkers who have driven
there for their exercise. Men and women of all ages, sizes, and
shapes can be seen walking briskly and purposefully along
the paths. An occasional jogger may brush past the walkers.
In the evening, children can be seen learning to ride bicycles
along the paths.
The link to the military is never quite far in spaces like this,
but nowhere is it perhaps as obvious as in the Nawala Urban
Wetland. Nawala is an emerging Colombo suburb, midway be-
tween the city of Colombo and the new capital complex in
Kotte. A long-neglected canal runs through Nawala, and at
one end of the canal, a small expanse of empty land was used
by construction workers for many years as a site to buy and
sell cement and sand. In 2012, the construction workers were
abruptly moved, and the area was cordoned off. The area has
now been neatly landscaped with artiﬁcial ponds and water-
falls. Paths for walking have been laid, and the adjacent canal
has been cleaned up. Admonitory signboards abound: food
cannot be consumed in the park; dogs cannot be walked; vis-
itors are enjoined to behave “decently.” Weirdly, a military
tank has been placed in one corner—children visiting the park
can be seen clambering in and around the tank and posing for
pictures by it.
But alongside this new vision of urban beauty, there have
been darker developments. Mosques and churches have been
attacked amid a rising sense of apprehension that the city
may ﬁnd itself engulfed in a repeat of the violence of July 1983.
These fears have most recently surfaced as a result of the activ-
ities of a new group of militant monks and their supporters,
called the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). The BBS emerged seemingly
from nowhere as the proud occupants of a shiny new multi-
story Buddhist Cultural Centre, built in 2012 on a prime site
close to Colombo University and the army headquarters. In
early 2013, BBS launched a campaign against the use of halal
certiﬁcation in food labeling in the supermarkets that have
proliferated in the last decade. Within weeks, there were at-
tacks on Muslim businesses amid wild rumors of jihadi groupsThis content downloaded from 23.235.32.0
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joyed the support of the Defence Secretary himself, a belief
apparently vindicated when he made a speech at the open-
ing of a new BBS training center in early 2013.
Colombo is not a traditionally Sinhala Buddhist space. The
areas marked for “development” are spaces where Sinhalese
are a minority and Muslims are the biggest ethnic group. This
regime cemented its power by waging and winning a ruthless
war against the LTTE. Its support comes from a Sinhala na-
tionalist base. The fact that the same military forces that
defeated the LTTE are now in charge of urban development
invests the plan with a power that previous proposals lacked.
As a shopkeeper in a shopping complex in a Colombo suburb
marked for “development” who had been served with an evic-
tion notice told Amarasuriya, “It is Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa
who has told us to go.” The emergence of BBS and its anti-
Muslim campaign, its link to Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, and the
renewed drive to relocate Colombo’s mainly Muslim low-
income residents suggests all too obvious connections be-
tween the current regime, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, and
its development project.
The Work of Time
In a recent overview of change in Indian cities, Nandini Gooptu
(2011) highlights processes that sound very close to those we
have been mapping in Colombo: the clearing of the poor and
repurposing of public space for bourgeois use. Gooptu’s point
is that similar processes have been at work in cities across the
world in recent decades. What, she asks, is distinctive about the
Indian experience? The answer would seem to be politics.
The Indian version of liberalization has been accompanied by
the so-called deepening of Indian democracy, with poor and
low-caste groups engaging as never before in electoral politics.
This in turn generates a range of contradictions and confron-
tations that give a speciﬁcally Indian cast to the politics of the
urban poor.
What, then, of Colombo and the politics of the urban
poor? What is speciﬁc to our story of dispossession and
beautiﬁcation? How does it differ from the Indian cases re-
viewed by Gooptu? The obvious answer would seem to be
the military and the kind of “postpolitical” project repre-
sented by the UDA and the Defence Secretary. The regional
comparison in this respect would seem to be Pakistan, where
the army has been involved for a long time in urban real
estate and, when it suited, urban planning (Siddiqa 2007).
The difference in the Sri Lankan case—and clearly there is
scope for a much more careful and sustained comparison
than can be attempted here—would not be the scale or the
ambition of the military but the relative novelty of its en-
gagement in these areas of life. One characteristic of the
postwar order is its instability and unpredictability. This,
we suggest, can be best understood in terms of two issues. on Tue, 17 Nov 2015 10:58:23 AM
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The ﬁrst, as in India, is the distinctive form of urban politics
(Das and Walton 2015). The second is time and the tem-
recognition: this is the effect of a behind-the-scenes politics
that leaves little visible trace and is clearly resistant to ethno-
vention have narrowed as the regime has taken charge of the higher
courts. In early 2013 the government successfully instituted an im-
peachment process to remove the chief justice of the Supreme Court
after she failed to support crucial moves to push back earlier constitu-
tional guarantees of devolution. The new chief justice has subsequently
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In a valuable survey of the housing of the poor based on
work conducted immediately before the MOD takeover of
the UDA, Wakely draws attention to two important points.
The ﬁrst is that whatever the complexities of tenurial circum-
stances, people in “under served settlements” in Colombo feel
little imminent threat of eviction (Wakely 2007:2). That was
2007, and the situation now is obviously reversed. The sec-
ond is the way in which areas of poor housing do not merely
serve as political resources for local politicians; in many ways
they are constituted through the medium of local politics.
“Informal” settlements are characteristically established un-
der the protection of powerful local ﬁgures, who might use
their own people to establish a settlement and then use their
connections to obtain connections to municipal services, be-
fore selling the houses on to others who need them (Wakely
2007:21). In this account, the familiar process of “quiet en-
croachment” (Bayat 2015) in Colombo is an inherently polit-
ical process. And the higher-level politicians at its heart may
include some of the most powerful (and notorious) ﬁgures
in the government. In contrast, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s proj-
ect to bring discipline to the poor is a project that seeks to
escape the constraints of local political processes.
As in India, the poor are also voters. As one veteran
Colombo politician put it to us, “This beautiﬁcation only re-
ally beneﬁts Colombo 3, 5, and 7 [the main districts of elite
housing], but the people in those districts don’t have that
many votes, and often they don’t even bother to vote. If you
want to win an election, you need the support of Colombo 1 to
15.” Or, as a leading academic critic of the regime explained in
an interview in 2011:
The majority of people who use Colombo are constituted
by the ﬂoating population that comes in the morning and
go out of Colombo in the evening. For these people a Co-
lombo city administered by the Ministry of Defence, clean
and attractive is something to be desired. It is not attractive
to the poor people living within Colombo. For them Co-
lombo is a place where they make a living.17
These comments followed the government’s comprehensive
defeat in the local elections in Colombo. After this, there
seemed to be a toning down of threats of eviction and little or
no evidence of actual evictions taking place (until very re-
cently). Despite widespread perceptions to the contrary, this
suggests that the sheer weight of numbers of watte-dwellers—
as translated into votes, could put some kind of brake on the
ambitions of the MOD. But this slowing down of evictions
and demolitions is not accompanied by any kind of public
17. N. M. Devasiri, “CMC Defeat: Is It a Challenge to the Govern-
ment,” interview with Lankadeepa, October 18, 2011, translated by Minna
Thaheer, http://www.infolanka.com/news/IL/dm124.htm (accessed July 2,
2013).
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eate the way in which a certain kind of politics might emerge
in the everyday life of the urban poor, the postwar moment
in Colombo seems to be one in which such politics, if they
are to be effective, have to become ever less visible (cf. Bear
2011:51).18 The corollary of an invisible politics, of course,
might be the steady growth of an equally invisible opposition.
If politics as usual might be seen as protecting the poor
from the more radical visions of the postwar city, a great deal
of the MOD pitch presents the Defence Secretary as a man
not encumbered by humdrum political considerations. This
is where time enters the picture: “We must move fast because
we were lagging behind due to the war that lasted 30 years.”
The implicit message in much of this public rhetoric in-
volves an analogy with the victory over the LTTE: in the ﬁght
against the LTTE, talk of “political solutions” came and went,
but it required decisive action by the military to get the job
done. So, too, in the ﬁght for a modern and beautiful Colombo.
The sense of a man in a hurry, of time accelerating, and
of improvements that had long been mired in political and
bureaucratic delay suddenly blossoming overnight brings to
mind Ssorin-Chaikov’s exploration of the temporal dimen-
sions of late Stalinism (Ssorin-Chaikov 2006). The obvious
point of comparison is the constant sense of urgency, of the
public need for things to be done immediately, to remind
everyone that we really do live in revolutionary times. But
there is more to the comparison than this. Ssorin-Chaikov’s
central theme is what he calls “heterochrony,” the coexis-
tence of multiple temporalities at work in a speciﬁc situation.
In analyzing gifts to Stalin, he draws on Bourdieu’s (1991)
remarks on the “work of time,” in which gifts require both
time and the uncertainty that duration brings with it in order
to do the work required of them in social relations. In the
lives of the poor, the ties that bind them to the politically
connected are the products of time passing relatively slowly,
and what beneﬁts they may accrue are the work of what
Procupez (2015) calls “patience.” Premadasa’s program of
steady upgrading of poor housing elevated the dynamic of
everyday urban politics to a new level, and the endurance
of his presence in the memory of the poor is testimony to the
effectiveness of his political project. The decisive arrival of
the bulldozers and breakers in Mews Street is the opposite,
and the memory of that moment has destabilized whatever
18. Another difference from the Indian situation (cf. Randeria and
Grunder 2011) is the extent to which the possibilities for legal inter-made his unwavering support for anything proposed by the government
abundantly clear.
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sense of security has been built over the years by poor res-
idents of the city.
ently positioned people, we found remarkably little evidence
of evictions or demolitions having taken place even as we
S74 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Supplement 11, October 2015There is also a future orientation in the UDA project, a vi-
sion of a city of clean, open spaces and endless consumption
opportunities. But coeval with this vision is the haunting pres-
ence of an alternative future, one in which everything that
matters—Buddhism, the Sinhala people—is under imminent
threat of destruction.19 This dark alternative, widely propa-
gated in speeches and newspaper articles, is central to the
appeal of the new Sinhala Buddhist nationalism of groups
like BBS. There are still other futures at stake: the older plan-
ners we spoke to, although ostensibly oriented to their own
visions of the future, seemed less bothered than might be ex-
pected by the apparent disengagement of their plans from
any possible implementation even as they pointed out frag-
ments of earlier, abandoned plans that had been picked up
and instituted by the current UDA regime. The new layout
of Independence Square, for example, had originally been
proposed in an otherwise forgotten document from the early
1960s. Rather than a straightforward orientation to the future,
those plans seemed to have a curiously allochronic relation to
the other social processes we analyzed.
At one level, the “new” Colombo we explored in 2013
looked to be a city made beautiful for a particular constit-
uency, the new, predominantly Sinhala, middle class of the
expanding suburbs. “Discipline” and “progress,” among other
things, were a useful alibi for the removal of the unsightly
poor and the political nulliﬁcation of the Muslims and Tamils
who dominate numerically in the city center. But progress
has its prices too. The capital behind the new hotels and
malls in the city center is rarely locally controlled; the her-
itage that is being rediscovered and restored is usually in-
escapably colonial and therefore also foreign. A government
keen to claim the Buddhist high ground for its projects is
entirely open to the building of new casinos. One charac-
teristic of the new “securitized” city, if that is what the MOD
control of the UDA really is, is a growing sense of cultural
insecurity, an insecurity informed by the different visions of
the immediate future that circulate with increasing velocity.
Coda 2015: The Autumn of the Patriarch
Two years have passed since we ﬁrst explored Slave Island,
and it is time to return to the temporality of the ethnog-
raphers. When we started the ﬁeld research for this paper,
we found ourselves entering a familiar narrative, a teleology
in which the poor and the marginal would be dispossessed
by a combination of authoritarian politics and speculative
capital. But as we moved across the city, speaking to differ-
19. As we made the penultimate revisions to this paper, the leading
government-owned English-language newspaper, the Daily News, ran
an editorial headlined “The Ongoing Genocide against the Sinhalese,”
January 22, 2014, http://www.dailynews.lk/editorial/ongoing-genocide
-against-sinhalese, accessed February 9, 2015.
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they would take place. That alerted us to the performative
dimension of the UDA project, the capacity to enact a certain
future simply by announcing it as inevitable. The ethical cor-
ollary for critical observers would be the cultivation of a cer-
tain ethnographic scepticism in the face of claims to inexora-
bility. To some extent the ethnographic perspective, which can
either hold ﬁrm to a very close inspection of a quite speciﬁc
moment or enter and reenter what is claimed to be a process—
and notice that nothing much seems to have changed—has a
corrective potential in the face of claims to have already de-
cided the properties of the urban future. Thus the voice we
employed, which emphasizes the speciﬁc moment in which
we made our observations and constructed our story, and
with which we tried to resist the sense of inevitability so
carefully cultivated by the regime.
For a time it was harder to cling to this counternarrative
we had constructed, with its thin shards of hope. On our last
visit to Slave Island, in December 2013, we discovered that
some of what was feared was actually taking place. People
had been ordered to leave their houses in Java Lane, and
already there were empty houses awaiting the demolition crew.
But even then, there was a kind of scaling back of the spec-
tacle of arbitrary power: papers had been served, some sort of
process had been followed through. Nevertheless, just weeks
after we had submitted the ﬁrst version of this paper for re-
view in February 2014, we discovered that the Java Lane
houses had been comprehensively demolished.
But the story has not stopped there. In late 2014, appar-
ently guided by an incompetent astrologer and a sense that
the opposition remained in terminal disarray, Mahinda Ra-
japaksa called a presidential election 2 years ahead of sched-
ule. An unexpected candidate, one of Rajapaksa’s senior min-
isters, Maithripala Sirisena, was announced as the “common
candidate” to stand on behalf of a remarkably diverse range of
opposition groups. He was swiftly joined by a number of other
powerful ﬁgures from Rajapaksa’s party. In a campaign tightly
focused on ending the excesses of Rajapaksa’s rule, Sirisena
emerged the winner by a slim margin in early January 2015.
Although Rajapaksa won majorities in his rural Buddhist heart-
land, he was heavily outvoted in the Tamil-speaking areas of the
north and east and in the urban areas. In Colombo Central,
Sirisena won 81% of the vote; Rajapaksa was reduced to 18%.
Within days of the new president’s appointment, a new, much
reduced, cabinet was announced, with many responsibilities
reallocated. The Urban Development Authority was removed
from the Ministry of Defence and handed over to the new
Minister of Urban Development, Rauf Hakeem, the leader of
the Sri LankaMuslimCongress. Seen in this light, the brief reign
of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s UDA conjures up a rather different
regional antecedent—Sanjay Gandhi, another man in a hurry,
another unelected member of a powerful family, and another
man with an authoritarian project of urban transformation on Tue, 17 Nov 2015 10:58:23 AM
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(Tarlo 2003). And just as Gandhi’s project swiftly met its dem-
ocratic nemesis, so too with Gotabhaya.
DeVotta, N., and J. Stone. 2008. Jathika Hela Urumaya and ethno-religious
politics in Sri Lanka. Paciﬁc Affairs 81(1):31–51.
Gooptu, N. 2011. Economic liberalization, urban politics and the poor.
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political circumstance, we returned in January 2015 to Slave
Island to see what had happened since Spencer’s last visit in
May 2013. Gazing at the ﬂattened rubble that had been Java
Lane, we noticed a poster advertising our friend’s papara
band. We asked a man lounging nearby if he knew what
had happened to the priest-cum-bandleader. He was okay, we
were told, but had left for a pilgrimage to India. And his shrine
with its images of lost President Premadasa? All gone. He
looked across at the rubble. “Mosques, temples, churches: they
destroyed them all. But look what happened to them!” He
brightened. “They will be cursed forever.”
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